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INTRODUCTION
In 2016, both major presidential candidates supported a big
increase in federal spending for infrastructure improvements.1 This is a
good thing in light of the state of America’s infrastructure.2 Given that
much of the nation’s infrastructure is owned and maintained by local
governments, such proposals require local governments to access the capital
markets even more than they currently do. And, as it is, the municipal
market is extremely large. In 2015 alone, there were 6,530 “new money”
municipal bond issues, totaling nearly $153.86 billion.3
Looking forward, there is therefore good reason to pause and think
about how local governments might access the capital markets more
efficiently. Looking backward, however, the Great Recession also provides
another reason to think about local governments and the capital markets, as
it revealed that local governments had not been issuing debt wisely.
*
Lori Raineri is the president of Government Financial Strategies. Darien Shanske
is a professor of law and political science at UC Davis. The authors wish to thank Bob
Hillman, Amie Kaewsriprach, Matthew Kolker and all of the participants in the Belmont
Law Review Symposium on The Modern Metropolis.
1. Conor Dougherty, Candidates in a Rare Accord, On Updating Infrastructure, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2016), at A1.
2. Id.
3. THE BOND BUYER, 2015 IN STATISTICS 3A (2015), available at
http://cdn.bondbuyer.com/pdfs/2015-in-statistics.pdf.
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For example, in the years leading up to the financial crisis of 2008,
numerous public entities borrowed for infrastructure projects using a
borrowing structure known as auction rate securities (“ARS”).4 By
February 2008, the total dollar amount of ARS outstanding was estimated
to be about $267 billion.5 To give a bit more context, the total municipal
market had $3.653 trillion outstanding in 2008.6 Thus, ARS represented a
substantial part of the market. In many ways, using ARS is analogous to
borrowing for a house using an adjustable rate mortgage (“ARM”). The
interest rates on ARS were lower than the rates for conventional borrowings
and, thus, public entities saved billions of dollars.7
Then the crisis of 2008 hit and the entities that used ARS, much
like the many individuals who used ARMs, found themselves in trouble,
costing governments millions—possibly billions—of dollars.8 These losses
came from governments (1) having to pay higher interest rates than
expected within these transactions, (2) having to pay to get out of these (or
related) transactions, and (3) having to pay to re-finance the debt using a
more conventional structure at a less than opportune time.9 Since 2008, no
ARS have been issued and only a tiny amount of ARS, approximately
twenty billion dollars, remain outstanding.10
So, the once flourishing ARS market is no more. What should
policymakers conclude about this?
One plausible, if Panglossian, analysis is that there is little to learn.
Government is obligated to uphold the public trust, and lowering borrowing
costs is consistent with this duty. This government duty justifies using
ARS. Whether the ARS market had design flaws that always doomed it or
only a crisis as severe as the Great Recession could have destroyed it, local

4. D. ANDREW AUSTIN, CONG. RES. SERV., AUCTION RATE SECURITIES 2 (2012),
available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34672.pdf.
5. Baixiao Liu et al., Why Did Auction Rate Bond Auctions Fail during 2008-2009?,
25 J. FIXED INCOME 1, 5 (Fall 2015), available at
http://www.krannert.purdue.edu/faculty/mcconnell/publications/PublicationsPDFS/Why . . .
2008%20JFI%20Fall%202010%20V20%20N2%205-18.pdf.
6. US Bond Market Issuance and Outstanding, SIFMA.ORG,
http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
7. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 1.
8. See, e.g., Michael McDonald, Auction Supply ‘Tsunami’ Portends Municipal
Losses, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 3, 2008). It should be noted that a certain amount of this money
was recovered from the banks that facilitated these transactions. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N., REPORT ON THE MUNICIPAL SECURITIES MARKET 9-10 (July 31, 2012),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/munireport073112.pdf. That the action of the
financial intermediaries was so outrageous that it resulted in large financial settlements does
not seem comforting to us.
9. McDonald, supra note 8, at 2.
10. Liu et al., supra note 5, at 4-5; US Municipal Bond Credit Report, Fourth Quarter
and Full Year 2015, SIFMA.ORG, http://www.sifma.org/research/item.aspx?id=8589958953
(follow the hyperlink under “US Municipal Bond Credit Report Fourth Quarter and Full
Year 2015”).
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governments are supposed to be laboratories of innovation, and sometimes
experiments fail.
We think the dominant analysis is more circumspect. The financial
crisis of 2008 made clear that government officials did not always
understand the implications of the financial instruments that they used.11
There will be other fiscal shocks, especially throughout the long terms over
which much borrowing occurs. Accordingly, government officials’ current
level of knowledge is inadequate and should be corrected, especially as to
more complex financial instruments. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Great
Recession, federal law has changed, largely through the Dodd-Frank Act, to
compel financial intermediaries to provide more information to government
issuers and to take the best interests of the government issuers into
account.12
In this Article, we will argue for yet a third analysis. Not every
problem is amenable to resolution through additional education or
disclosure. We will explain why the ARS debacle illustrates that there are
certain kinds of borrowing structures that should be categorically
prohibited.
I. BACKGROUND
Interest rates are the price a borrower pays for the use of someone
else’s money. When we talk about the movements of interest rates, we often
use U.S. Treasuries, the rate at which the United States borrows, as a
benchmark.13 As the Great Recession began, there was not only a general
and steep decline in short term interest rates, but also great volatility.14 It
will be useful to keep this in mind as our story unfolds.

11. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg & Carter Dougherty, From Midwest to M.T.A., Pain
From Global Gamble, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2008, at A1.
12. For the consensus on knowledge, see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8, at
91-95; see id. at 96-98 (summary of some changes in federal law).
13. Michael J. Flemming, The Benchmark U.S. Treasury Market: Recent Performance
and Possible Alternatives, 6 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. ECON. POL’Y REV. 1, 1 (2000),
available at
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/00v06n1/0004flem.pdf.
14. See 1-Month Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, FEDERAL RESERVE ECONOMIC
DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS1MO (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
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CHART 1: Interest Rates and the Great Recession (Grey shading
indicates recession)15
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Typically, the longer the term over which someone wants to borrow
money, the higher the interest rate. This is an observed “normal” economic
condition, generally thought to reflect considerations of the yield on
Treasury securities plus adjustments for risks related to inflation, default,
liquidity, and maturity for the specific borrowing.16 A yield curve shows the
yield of bonds by maturity and thereby reflects the term structure of interest
rates. No person or institution dictates the yield curve. Rather, the yield
curve results from supply and demand in the capital markets. When the
interest rates go up as maturity terms are longer, the yield curve is normal,
and when interest rates are higher for shorter terms than longer terms, the
yield curve is described as inverted by economists and market participants.
Thus, it is normal for short-term interest rates to be lower than long-term
rates, and the slope of the yield curve tells us by how much.
As shown below, the yield curve was frequently inverted during the
crisis of 2008.17 Thus, for instance, in January of 2008, it was cheaper to
borrow for three years than it was for three months.

15. Id.
16. The five specific components of the yield curve are: (1) Risk-Free Rate, (2)
Inflation Premium, (3) Default Risk Premium, (4) Liquidity Premium, and (5) Maturity Risk
Premium. These components work together as a formula: rrf + IP + DRP + LP + MRP =
Interest Rate. See generally EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & MICHAEL C. EHRHARDT, FINANCIAL
MANAGEMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 177 (2008).
17. See Treasury Yield Curve, U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS.,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/HistoricYield-Data-Visualization.aspx (last visited Nov. 7, 2016) (in order to generate the data).
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CHART 2: Yield Curves18

Now, let’s begin a running example of a municipality wishing to
undertake a large capital project, say, building a new tunnel to ease
downtown congestion. Another rule of financial management is that the
financing of an asset should roughly align with the useful life of the asset.19
This is both fair and sensible. Let’s say the new tunnel will cost $100
million. The alignment is fair because there is no reason why that entire
cost should be borne by current residents of the city. The alignment is also
sensible because if debt payments are not spread out, then big projects like
this could hardly ever be built. It is likely that a major capital project is as
large as the city’s entire operating budget. It would take a long time for a
municipality to save that much money.20 Accordingly, pay-as-you-use (payuse or debt) financing has dominated pay-as-you-go (pay-go or cash)
infrastructure financing for a very long time.21
We will stipulate that the useful life of the tunnel is thirty years and
that that is the period over which the borrowing for this tunnel should be
repaid. The city is likely to get a good deal on its borrowing for several
18. Id.
19. See generally Role of the Finance Director in Capital Asset Management, GOV.
FIN. OFFICERS ASS’N, http://www.gfoa.org/role-finance-director-capital-asset-management
(last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
20. Dwight Denison & Zihe Guo, Local Debt Management and Budget Stabilization in
LOCAL GOVERNMENT BUDGET STABILIZATION: EXPLORATIONS AND EVIDENCE 122 (Yilin Hou
ed.).
21. See, e.g., Wen Wang & Yilin Hou, Pay-as-You-Go Financing and Capital Outlay
Volatility: Evidence from the States over Two Recent Economic Cycles, 29 PUB. BUDGETING
& FIN. 1, 92-96 (Winter 2009).
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reasons. First, relative to most individuals and businesses, cities are usually
fairly diverse economically. Second, definitely unlike individuals and
businesses, cities generally have the power to raise taxes in order to raise
revenue. Third, because of the governmental nature of cities, the interest on
the bonds they will issue is likely exempt from federal and state income
taxes. Thus, the resulting interest rate is likely lower than the borrowing
rate for corporate issuers or even the U.S. government.
CHART 3: Comparison of Long-Term Interest Rates (Grey shading
indicates recession)22
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As this chart indicates, the borrowing rate for many localities has
generally been competitive with the borrowing rates paid by the highestrated corporations and the United States itself.23 Still, this chart only
compares long-term bond issues; that is, borrowings for over twenty years.
Wouldn’t it be better to travel “down” the yield curve and borrow at the rate
of borrowing for one year rather than thirty? Of course!
There are two basic approaches. The first is to use a variable rate
structure. This is much like using an ARM for financing one’s home. The
basic idea is that the borrower is only locking in a rate for a short amount of
time, say a year, but that rate is equal to the lower interest rate available for
short-term borrowing. After the year is up, the borrower must borrow
again24 and then again at the lower end of the yield curve. However, the key
is that these interest rates are not fixed when the debt is issued but are
readjusted at fixed dates. In several years, it is possible that short-term

22. Moody’s Seasoned AAA Corporate Bond Yield, FEDERAL RESERVE ECONOMIC
DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AAA (last visited Mar. 19 2017).
23. Id.
24. This is a little bit of an oversimplification. Technically, the bond-holders can force
the issuer to take back the bonds (a put option, i.e., an option to sell). CALIFORNIA DEBT AND
INVESTMENT ADVISORY COMMISSION (“CDIAC”), ISSUE BRIEF: AUCTION RATE SECURITIES 2
(Aug. 2004). In order to make sure that there is money to repurchase the bonds, the issuers
of variable rate bonds must also purchase a line of credit from a bank. This is expensive and
is not a requirement for ARS. Id.
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interest rates are higher than the current long-term interest rates. So, for
instance, consider the following chart:
CHART 4: Short-Term v. Long-Term Tax Exempt Interest Rates25
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The short-term index does stay consistently below the long-term
index, but not always by very much. Consider the yield curve at the present
moment, i.e., at the time of writing.
CHART 5: Current Municipal Yield Curve26
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25. See Bond Buyer Indexes, THE BOND BUYER,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/apps/custom/msa_search.php?product=bbi_history&col1=1
&start_date=01%2F03%2F1990&end_date=01%2F03%2F2012&submit=GO (last visited
Mar. 19, 2017).
26. See Standard & Poor's Intraday Municipal Bond Yield Curves, THE BOND BUYER,
http://www.bondbuyer.com/marketstatistics/dailycurve/#dataTable (last visited Sept. 22,
2016).
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The current yield curve is normal, which indicates that borrowing
for a shorter time is cheaper than borrowing over a longer period. However,
the difference in this borrowing rate is not significant by historical
standards (see Chart 4).27 Still, the difference is real and substantial. ARS
were financial innovations that took this insight about yields usually being
lower on shorter-term borrowings one step further.28 The rate for a one-year
borrowing is still not as good as, say, a twenty-eight day borrowing. Of
course, borrowing every month would seem to be a big hassle.
Rather than organize a full-blown borrowing, the banker for the
issuer would organize a “Dutch” auction. Different lenders would state
what interest rate they would charge for a twenty-eight-day borrowing and
how much they would be willing to lend. The bank then awards the
borrowing to the various bidders based on the “clearing rate.” The clearing
rate is the rate at which all potential lenders will get their bid rates or better
with all the debt being purchased.29
TABLE 1: Simplified ARS Dutch Auction30

In this simplified example, the clearing rate is 2.5% because, at that
rate, all available (200) shares are sold to three bidders who all had their
minimum price met or exceeded.
One key idea behind ARS is that there were many institutions and
individuals with lots of money that would be happy to park that money in a
very short-term municipal security for a little while. Furthermore, this
system also assumed that the banks that arranged these auctions had plenty
of cash and could and would step in and invest their own money for a short
time rather than allow an auction to fail—i.e., have insufficient bidders.31
27. See id.
28. Song Han & Dan Li, Liquidity, Runs, and Security Design (February 15, 2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1344136 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1344136; see generally
CDIAC supra note 24, at 2.
29. Han & Li, supra note 28, at 7.
30. For a more involved example, see CDIAC supra note 24. This example omits,
among other things, what happens when there are current holders of ARS shares who want
to keep them.
31. Han & Li, supra note 28, at 11.
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The ARS market collapsed in early 2008 when banks stopped supporting
their auctions, that is, stopped stepping in to provide liquidity when no one
else would.32
When the auctions failed, there were several consequences. For the
investors, the failed auctions meant they could not get their money out.33
For the issuers, failed auctions triggered their having to pay high maximum
rates.34 Given the number of deals and their complexities, one cannot say
that there was one maximum rate or even be sure what the average rate was.
The most thorough study we are aware of reports that the maximum rate on
bonds with a fixed maximum rate “mostly concentrate on twelve and fifteen
percent.”35 Many bonds had floating fixed rates that were lower, while
some fixed rates were even higher: the Port Authority of New York was
apparently saddled with a twenty percent maximum rate.36 We should pause
for a moment to observe how high these rates were relative both to shortterm and long-term rates during the years leading up to the crash. The jump
in relative short-term rates indicates the budgeting problem that these
issuers faced. They had budgeted to pay under one percent and now had to
pay twelve percent.37 The jump in relative long-term rates indicates how
preferable it would have been just to issue at a long-term rate to begin with.
The following chart is a further illustration of the problem that
issuers faced.

32. Id. at 7. Whether the banks had made a legal commitment to step in is of course a
matter of dispute, but there have been large settlements. See also U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, supra note 8, at 17; Liu et al., supra note 5, at 6.
33. See Han & Li, supra note 28, at 7.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 9-12.
36. Id. at 6 n.3; see also Dwight V. Denison & J. Bryan Gibson, A Tale Of Market
Risk, False Hope, And Corruption: The Impact of Adjustable Rate Debt on the Jefferson
County, Alabama Sewer Authority, 25 J. OF PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 311
(2013) (reporting that Jefferson County’s rate rose to ten percent).
37. See Han & Li, supra note 28, at 9-12.
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CHART 6: The Surprising Cost of Auction Rate Securities38
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The chart above shows how thirteen years of savings could easily
be wiped out by one year of failed auctions. Furthermore, because the
savings accumulate with each successful auction, the amount of risk from a
failed auction is a moving target. The risk management that would be
required to hedge and perhaps re-hedge this risk is significant. And,
because the ARS were supposed to operate like money market instruments,
the idea of hedging ARS risk was antithetical to what it was perceived to be
and, therefore, generally not done.
Faced with failed auctions and high maximum rates, issuers paid
termination payments and refinanced their ARS using traditional fixed and
variable rate structures.39
II. TWO PRINCIPLES IN TENSION
We have now told the story of ARS, albeit briefly. We now
consider the story from a broader perspective. It is too easy to dismiss the
issuing of ARS as simply a bad idea. Using the ARS structure was sensible
on many grounds, which we will explain below. Of course, the stronger the
case we make for the use of ARS, the more one might wonder whether it
was ever a mistake to use them. From our perspective, the question of the
propriety of ARS represents a clash of principles. The principle inclining to
the issuance of ARS, preserve public dollars, was applied too aggressively
38. See Bond Buyer Indexes, supra note 25.
39. The full story is, of course, more complicated. See CRAIG L. JOHNSON ET AL.,
STATE AND LOCAL FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS 162-64 (2014).
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relative to an equally important, but under-appreciated, principle: avoid
asymmetric risk.
A.

Preserve Public Dollars

Clearly, what happened to the ARS market was unfortunate, but a
plausible argument can be made that government officials were only doing
what they were supposed to be doing—namely, trying to save tax dollars. It
is a deep principle of government financial management that tax dollars are
a trust and are to be treated with care. This principle is found throughout the
law.
For instance, state constitutions generally include a blanket
prohibition on the gift of public funds.40 Government officials generally
must submit public projects to bidding.41 Those same officials are also
barred from having a financial interest in any decision they might make.42
Various open government laws are, of course, also justified as a means of
ensuring that the public is able to keep tabs on how its money is spent.43
There is a more specific application of this principle to sound debt
management. Advocates of sound municipal debt management have long
argued—often in vain—that municipalities should be constrained to sell
their debts competitively.44 It is only by means of a competitive sale that
governments and taxpayers can be certain that they are getting the best
possible deal, and this theoretical point about the benefit of competition is
supported by the majority of research.45 If, therefore, it is best for localities
to put their debts up for auction at the moment of initial sale, then why was

40. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 6 (“The Legislature shall have no power . . . to make
any gift . . . of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other
corporation . . . .”); see Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State
Fiscal Limits and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 909-10 (2003) (for a
general discussion of these provisions).
41. See CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 20162 (2016) (“When the expenditure required for a
public project exceeds five thousand dollars ($5,000), it shall be contracted for and let to the
lowest responsible bidder after notice.”) (this provision regards cities but similar provisions
govern other entities).
42. See CAL. GOV’T CODE § 1090(a) (2015) (“Members of the Legislature, state,
county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees shall not be financially
interested in any contract made by them in their official capacity, or by any body or board of
which they are members. Nor shall state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or
employees be purchasers at any sale or vendors at any purchase made by them in their
official capacity.”).
43. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 54950-63 (2015).
44. Bill Simonsen, Competition and Selection in Municipal Bond Sales: Evidence
from Missouri, 27 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 88 (2007); see also Mark Robbins & Bill
Simonsen, Missouri Municipal Bonds: The Cost of No Reforms, 36 MUN. FIN. J. 27 (2015).
45. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8, at 17. (“Negotiated offerings appear to
be more expensive for issuers than competitive offerings both in terms of bond yields and
underwriter gross spreads.”).
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it unreasonable to suppose that regular competitive auctions would continue
to ensure that localities were getting the best deal possible?
There were even more fine-grained reasons to use ARS. A large
entity like New York City was, by necessity, already heavily exposed to
short-term interest rates.46 This is because New York had large financial
reserves that were invested in very short-term liquid securities. These
investments did not, of course, yield high interest rates. Why should New
York not benefit from lower short-term rates by also borrowing at these
rates? If short-term rates were to increase, then that would be a cost for
New York as a borrower, but it would be a boon for New York as an
investor. If the investments and borrowings in short-term securities are
appropriately balanced, then New York has made its overall financial
picture more balanced and less risky through the use of ARS.
Finally, and also weighing in favor of the use of ARS, there is the
theory of fiscal federalism. This theory has many moving parts, but the key
part for our purposes is that a federal system will only enjoy the benefits of
federalism if the component jurisdictions work under hard budget
constraints.47 To translate: a federal system, by definition, has many lowerlevel jurisdictions. In the U.S. context, there are the states and, within
states, various kinds of localities. These different subnational jurisdictions
can, among other things, compete with each other to provide better services
to their citizens at a better cost.48 Amidst this jurisdictional competition, one
jurisdiction might hit upon the following strategy if the central government
is known to bail out improvident subnational governments: impose low
taxes and provide high services, while borrowing to cover the difference. If
the strategy works, then perhaps all the new economic activity the
jurisdiction attracts might allow it to pay off its debt but, if not, the central
government can be counted on to step in. In order to prevent this moral
hazard, subnational governments cannot be allowed to overspend and just
wait for a bailout from the central government. This is what it means for
lower level governments to be subject to a “hard budget constraint.”
Hard budget constraints take various typical forms within the
United States. States and localities often are constrained to balance their
budgets,49 to go through additional procedures to issue debt,50 and are often
46. Darcy Bradbury & Frank Oh, Issuers’ Risk Management Using Derivatives and
Variable-Rate Debt, in THE HANDBOOK OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 37, 37-48 (S. Heide, R. Klein,
and J. Lederman Eds., 1994).
47. See, e.g., Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN
STATES GO BROKE 123 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. ed., 2012); Teresa TerMinassian, Borrowing by Subnational Governments-Issues and Selected International
Experiences, in INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, PPAA 96/4 (1996); see also Clayton P.
Gillette, Fiscal Federalism, Political Will, and Strategic Use of Municipal Bankruptcy, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 289-90, 316-18 (2012).
48. They can also offer different packages of amenities.
49. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 18; see also Briffault, supra note 40.
50. See Briffault, supra note 40.

2017]

MUNICIPAL FINANCE

77

subject to a debt cap.51 Perhaps most importantly, lower level governments
need to believe that they will not be bailed out by the central government.
For the American federation, the key moment in this regard came in the
1840s, when the federal government refused to bail out financially-strapped
states.52 Indeed, formal rules in state and local law trying to control state
and local budgets ex ante have followed from the experience of having not
been bailed out by the central government. 53
What does the theory of fiscal federalism have to do with ARS?
The answer is that since localities will suffer for their own poor choices,
they already have an incentive to issue debt wisely. Thus, there is a way in
which the ARS story is a happy one from the fiscal federalist perspective.
Some localities experimented with a financial instrument in order to better
serve their constituents. The instrument did not work as intended and the
localities had to pay the price. Lesson learned.
B.

Avoid Asymmetric Risk

Despite the sensible considerations in favor of localities having the
power to issue ARS, the consensus—we think—is that the widespread use
of these securities was not appropriate. Conserving public dollars is not the
only factor or principle at play here; several other factors are relevant.
Primarily, there is the matter of risk. After all, a small bet placed in a casino
could also yield big returns for a government, but outright gambling is
clearly a violation of the public trust. In short, we think that local
governments should abide by a principle of avoiding asymmetric risk. This
principle is less known, but it should not be.
To illustrate the principle of avoiding asymmetric risk, let’s return
to the ARS story. Remember that in the midst of the 2008 financial crisis,
the failure of auctions resulted in some issuers paying interest rates many
times what they had expected. This clearly imposed a big burden on sound
budgeting, even assuming that a local government has the funds on hand to
make the additional payment. And this is before the issuer of a failed ARS
had to amass even more money to get out of the auction rate security and
reissue conventional debt.
In our background discussion, we indicated that, in many cases,
ARS provides relatively little benefit compared to the assumed risk. This
was the case in the spectacular failure of Jefferson County, Alabama, which
used ARS extensively.
51. Id.
52. Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts: Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with
Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW IN FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 56-61 (Jonathan
Rodden et al. ed. 2003).
53. Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Joseph Wallis, Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal
Crises, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE 31-32 (Peter Conti-Brown & David A. Skeel, Jr. ed.
2012).
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CHART 7: Auction Rate Securities and Jefferson County54

In order to save a small amount of money on debt service, Jefferson
County took on the risk that its debt service payments would skyrocket,
which indeed happened. To be sure, this is an extreme case in some ways
because of the extent to which Jefferson County had restructured its total
debt to use ARS.55 However, as we have already seen, the possible jump in
debt service is not wholly atypical.
Here is an example from the Chicago Public Schools, which is an
entity that did not go bankrupt. This chart compares the performance of one
of Chicago Public Schools’ ARS in comparison to a more traditional, but
still short-term, variable rate financing.

54. Denison & Gibson, supra note 36, at 334.
55. Id. at 325-28.
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CHART 8: Auction Rate Financings and the Chicago Public Schools56

In this case, we see just how much risk the school system took on
by issuing an ARS, even relative to a variable rate financing, and how little
the schools gained during the “good” times.
We are not the only ones who have observed this skewed risk
versus reward tradeoff. As the Congressional Research Service put it,
In effect, ARSs bundled small, albeit not insignificant,
benefits during normal economic times with serious costs
in the event of unusual financial turmoil. Thus, the basic
structure of ARSs incorporated important asymmetric
risks.57
An asymmetric risk bundles a large risk with a small reward. This
bundling does not explain why localities in particular should shun such
risks even when the risks are likely to save them money. There are at least
six reasons for local governments in particular not to take on such risks.
First, local governments are almost always going to be more
vulnerable to economic shocks outside of their control relative to larger

56. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 39, at 161.
57. AUSTIN, supra note 4, at 24.
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governmental units.58 Thus, the local governments are bearing a great deal
of risk already. Amplifying the risk is not wise, especially since there could
well be correlations between locational risk and the risks incorporated into
these financings.59
Second, per the fiscal federalism literature, local governments are
(properly) hemmed in by hard budget constraints.60 They cannot go into the
marketplace and borrow for operating expenses to handle an unexpected
expense.
Third, by definition, capital borrowings are often large relative to a
government’s operating budget. This means that big changes in annual debt
service will often amount to significant costs for the entity, its taxpayers, or
both.61
Fourth, though it is proper for governments to maintain reserves to
cope with uncertainties, reserves should not and cannot be so great that
large amounts of taxpayer dollars are sitting idle.62 Thus, local governments
cannot sock away large reserve funds in case of surprising changes in
interest rates. In any event, calculating reserves in case of interest rate shifts
adds an entirely new level of complexity to budgeting.
Fifth, asymmetric risks are inherently complicated and thus
introduce complexity into the budgets of local government entities that will
often be unlikely to have the expertise to manage the risks.63
Sixth, governments provide essential services to their
constituents—services that cannot and ought not be cut for a few months to
make a higher debt payment. In addition, as recently occurred during the
Great Recession, it is likely that the demand for government services will
increase just when tax revenues are down and when riskier debt instruments
go south.
III. TWO KINDS OF SOLUTIONS
Suppose one is convinced that there is a problem here about the use
of complex financial instruments. It seems to us that there are two basic
approaches that can be taken. One can argue that the institutional
intervention required should be on the demand-side. By this, we mean
58. See, e.g., RICHARD SCHRAGGER, CITY POWER 39-40 (2016).
59. See generally David Gamage, Preventing State Budget Crises: Redefining “Tax
Cuts” and “Tax Hikes”, 98 CAL. L. REV. 749, 784-87 (2010) (arguing that the poor suffer
most from budget cuts during crises).
60. Gillette, supra note 47, at 301.
61. Id. at 313.
62. See, e.g., Gamage, supra note 59, at 766-67; Brian D. Galle & Kirk Stark, Beyond
Bailouts: Federal Supports for State Rainy Day Funds, 87 IND. L.J. 599, 611-617 (2012)
(cataloging some reasons for the failure of states to maintain sufficient reserves).
63. See, e.g., Simonsen et al., The Influence of Jurisdiction Size and Sale Type on
Municipal Bond Interest Rates: An Empirical Analysis, 61 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 709, 709-10
(2001).
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interventions that focus on the decision to issue financial instruments. Such
intervention could be in the form of better disclosure to issuers, better
education of issuers, or a higher level of responsibility of intermediaries to
issuers. We have no objection per se to any of these demand-side
approaches. More education is a good thing, as are the various new federal
rules that increase the duties of intermediaries to municipal issuers.64
However, regulation does not work only through the demand-side.
When a product is sufficiently unsafe, the effective response is not to
disclose the problem, but to recall the product.65 We think that ARS should
be subject to recall, a supply solution, and not just additional demand-side
management. There are two reasons for this. The first reason is the primary
contribution of this paper, which is to demonstrate that the cost-benefit ratio
is too skewed. The second reason is that the case of ARS is likely one
where additional disclosure will be of limited use.
As to the first reason, we have already listed the many reasons why
local governments cannot bear asymmetric risks. In short, this is because
they do not have the expertise, the revenue raising power, or the reserves to
absorb great shocks. They also have important work to do.
As for the second reason, supposing that disclosure is going to be a
magic bullet in this context flies in the face of the great weight of the
evidence regarding decision-making about complex financial matters.
Ordinary citizens have a difficult time making complex financial
decisions66 and do not necessarily appreciate the significance of
disclosure.67 Furthermore, as the example of ARS indicates, those same
citizens serving on local governments do not do all that much better.
CONCLUSION: THE CAMEL’S NOSE OR TAIL?
One response to our argument could be that ARS are an exceptional
example as this is a financial instrument so flawed that it has disappeared
altogether. Therefore, the argument that there should be a categorical rule
64. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 8; see also Charles W. Cole, Lessons
From Mars! Were Municipal Auction Rate Securities a Financial Innovation? Conflict of
Interest, Lack of Transparency, And Agency Costs in the MARS Market, 31 MUN. FIN. J. 77,
91-92 (2010).
65. See generally Saule T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of
Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 064 (2012). Omarova argues that
complex financial products should be subject to pre-approval because of the systemic risk
they pose to the financial system. We are making a similar argument as to complex financial
products to be used by subnational governments. Rather than aim to limit systemic risk, we
are arguing that these products should be limited in the municipal context because of
asymmetric risk.
66. See generally Annamaria Lusardi & Peter Tufano, Debt Literacy, Financial
Experiences and Overindebtedness (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
14808, 2009).
67. See, e.g., Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of
Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2005).
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about them is a little too easy. We concede that ARS are an “easy”
example, but there are other examples that we think, if developed, would all
be about as “easy.” There are so many financial instruments out there. We
have already mentioned VRDOs. Another example is interest rate swaps,
which essentially allow an issuer to move from a short-term rate to a longterm rate.68 Swaps were often packaged with ARS as a means of reducing
the interest rate risk resulting from ARS and have also been implicated in
many high profile disasters, such as Jefferson County and Detroit.69
There are also capital appreciation bonds. In short, these are bonds
structured so that payment of the principal is put off, resulting in large
payments of principal and interest deferred far off into the future. Needless
to say, the ability to get money for projects now but defer payments for
later has proven to be very appealing and has saddled many local
governments with enormous and unnecessary debt burdens.70
The bestiary of financial instruments can be added to. For instance,
there are synthetic forward refundings . . .
All of these financial instruments, like ARS, have legitimate uses.
The problem is that these uses are limited and require expertise as, in
fairness, proponents of these structures warned from the start.71 The ARS
crisis illustrated that many issuers did not have sufficient expertise, which is
not surprising. Most municipal issuers are small and infrequent and, hence,
unlikely to have a great deal of in-house financial expertise.72 It is also
worth noting that even large issuers that surely did have expertise got
burned in the crisis. For instance, as mentioned above, the Port Authority of
New York ended up saddled with failed ARS, as did many other large and
sophisticated issuers.

68. See Denison & Gibson, supra note 36, at 339-40.
69. See generally id. For instance, in Jefferson County. The use of interest rate swaps
to hedge the interest rate risk posed by ARS illustrates several important points. First, at
least in theory, additional financial engineering could reduce, even eliminate, the risk posed
by financial engineering to begin with. Of course, this additional hedging is not costless and
further reduces the benefit of financial engineering. In theory, if the market is operating
perfectly, perfect hedging should place the issuer in the same place it would have been just
issuing a long-term security. Second, it is not likely to be possible for there to be perfect
hedging. For instance, the ARS crisis resulted in part because there was insufficient
appreciation of counter-party risk. Third, each additional piece of engineering is expensive
and yields fees for financial intermediaries, a point we develop in the text.
70. L.A. CNTY. CIVIL GRAND JURY, CAPITAL APPRECIATION BONDS AND OTHER
SCHOOL BOND DEBT: CONSEQUENCES OF POOR FINANCIAL PRACTICES 103-04 (2015-2016),
available at http://www.calboc.org/docs/LACGJ_CAB_Final2015-2016.pdf. Note that one
of the authors (Raineri) helped in the production of this report.
71. See, e.g., Bradbury & Oh, supra note 46, at 45; Joanne S. Feld, Variable Rate
Demand Obligations for Issuers of Water and Sewer Debt: An Analytic Framework, 22
MUN. FIN. J., 1, 25 (Summer 2001); see also Denison & Gibson, supra note 36, at 337, 339
(lessons from Jefferson County).
72. Simonsen et al., supra note 63, at 709-10.
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The financial intermediaries who are supposed to provide
governments with expertise73 are inherently conflicted when their business
models either rely on generating fees from transactions, as they often do, or
make the fees contingent on the transaction being done, as is also common.
To some extent, this conflict has always been there. However, it is now
well-known that the financial sector has grown larger and is in more need
of fees from transactions than it was before.74 Thus, the conflict has only
grown.
Therefore, we think that ARS are an easy example of a larger
phenomenon, namely intermediaries proposing overly complex and feeproducing funding structures that save issuers—at best—small amounts of
money at the expense of taking on asymmetric risk. There is thus a need for
a regulatory intervention to level the playing field. This intervention should
guide almost all issuers away from asymmetric risks and toward long-term,
fixed-rate borrowing. In particular, we think there is a need for a state-level
debt management authority modeled on the very successful Local
Government Commission in North Carolina.75 Such a commission should
establish sensible default rules, such as only using competitive sales and
generally monitoring local debt issuances for asymmetric risk.76 If the
federal government is about to give states and localities large incentives to
borrow for more infrastructure, it should consider how it might prod the
states to enable their localities to borrow more wisely. Or, if the federal
government is about to give localities more incentives to borrow less
wisely, as now seems at least as likely, then it is imperative that the states
act to protect their localities.77

73. We should observe that many of the financial intermediaries in these cases likely
themselves did not understand the risks involved in the products they were selling.
74. Kathryn Judge, Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHIC. L. REV. 573, 573-76 (2015).
75. One of us (Shanske) discusses the North Carolina case further here: Darien
Shanske, The (Now Urgent) Case for State-Level Monitoring of Local Government Finances
(or one way to protect localities from Trump’s “Potemkin Villages of Nothing”), NYU J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming).
76. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 159-151 (1991) (“No bonds may be issued under
this Article unless the issue is approved by the Local Government Commission.”); Charles
K. Coe, Preventing Local Government Fiscal Crises: The North Carolina Approach, 27
PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 39, 41 (2007) (“The LGC sells all GO bonds competitively. . . . In
deciding whether a local government can sell a GO bond, the LGC evaluates the adequacy of
the bond amount, the bond’s effect on the property tax rate, and whether the bond can be
marketed at a reasonable interest rate.”).
77. See Shanske, supra note 75.
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